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THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY CONTRACTS
The City of Fort Wayne and appellee contracted for the con-
struction of a sewer beneath the surface of a paved street upon which
appellant's lot abutted. Damages were sought for the injury to appel-
lant's frame building, caused by tunneling. The complaint averred that
the city and appellee knew the nature of the soil and that appellants
property would be deprived of lateral support. The contract stipulated
that the contractor (appellee) would pay all damages arising from the
work whether initiated by negligence or not. Appellant contended that
the contract is in the nature of insurance against incidental or con-
sequential damages for which otherwise appellant would have no remedy.
Appellee demurred. When the demurrer was sustained, the appellant
refused to plead over. Held, Reversed. Where the sewer contractor
agreed to pay all claims for damages for injury to property, owner of
the building could recover as a third party beneficiary if owner could
prove causal connection. Freigy v. Ga'rgaro Co., - Ind. -, 60 N.E.
(2d) 288 (1945).
This case supports the modern doctrine that a third party benefici-
ary, not a party to the contract, can sue upon the contract.1 The doctrine
holds that where one person agrees with another on a sufficient con-
sideration, to do a thing for the benefit of a third person, the latter
may enforce the contract. 2 Ability of the third party beneficiary to sue,
even though not privy to the contract, has been supported in most of
the American states, including Indiana, although it is not the majority
rule in England today s
The theory upon which the court proceeded was that the right of
the third party beneficiary rests on the liability of the promisor, and
this liability must affirmatively appear from the language of the con-
tract when properly construed. 4 The liability so appearing cannot be
extended or enlarged merely on the ground that the situation and cir-
1. Carson Pirie Scott & Company v. W. J. Parrett et al., 346 Ill. 252,
178 N.E. 498, 81 A.L.R. 1262, 1271 (1931); Hendrick v. Lindsay,
93 U.S. 143 (1876); Bird v. Lanius, 7 Ind. 615 (1856); Harper v.
Ragan, 2 Blackf. 39 (Ind. 1837); Corbin, "Contracts for the Benefit
of Third Persons in the Federal Courts," (1930) 39 Yale L. J. 601.
2. Day v. Patterson, 18 Ind. 114 (1862); Ferris v. Am. Brewing Com-
pany, 155 Ind. 539, 58 N.E. 701, 52 L.R.A. 305 (1900); Miller v.
Farr, 178 Ind. 36, 98 N.E. 805 (1912).
3. McCoy v. McCoy, 32 Ind. App. 38, 69 N.E. 193 (1903); Edwards v.
Van Cleave, 47 Ind. App. 347, 94 N.E. 596 (1903); Reed v. Adams
Steel & Wire Works, 57 Ind. App. 259, 106 N.E. 885 (1914); Nash
Engineering Co. v. Marcy Realty Corp., Inc. et al., 222 Ind. 396,
54 N.E. (2d) 263 (1944); Knight-Jillison v. Castle, 172 Ind. 97, 87
N.E. 976 (1909); La Mourea v. Rhude, 209 Minn. 53, 295 N.W. 304(1940); Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 Best & S. 393, 121 Eng. Reprint,
762 (1861); 9 Am. Jur., Building and Construction Contracts,
§94 ff.
4. Carson Pine Scott & Company v. W. J. Parrett et al., 346 fll. 252,
178 N.E. 498, 81 A.L.R. 1260, 1271 (1931); Anson, "Contracts"(1930), §295. A number of theories have been offered as rationales
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cumstances of the parties justify or demand further or other liability.5
If a contract be entered into for a direct benefit of a third person, not
a party thereto, such third person may sue for breach thereof.6 The
test is whether the benefit to the third person is direct to him or is
but an incidental benefit to him arising from the contract.7 If direct, he
may sue on the contract; if incidental, he has no right of recovery.8
In an indemnity contract, the damages necessary for recovery need
not be restricted to damages awarded by a court for liability or damages
incurred by the violations of a legal right in property.9 Here, apparently,
there was no negligence or other breach of duty by the city or appellee
as against the appellant. It is not essential to the right of creditor or
donee beneficiary of a contract to recover thereon that he be identified
when the contract containing the promise is made.' 0
The instant case, allowing the parties to a contract the capacity to




Appellant suited for retirement benefits under the respondent cor-
poration's pension plan which provided that, "No pension or gratuity
of the third party beneficiary doctrine. (1) The agency theory
makes the promisee the agent of the beneficiary, but this is fictional
since the beneficiary does not make the promisee his agent. Gardner
v. Denison, 217 Mass. 492, 105 N.E. 359, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1108
(1914); Williston, Contracts (1920), §352; Anson, Contracts (1930),
§277, 283. (2) Another theory finds a trust in a third party
beneficiary contract; but this is weak, since there is no holding of
legal title by a trustee. Seaver v. Ransom et al., 224 N.Y. 233, 120
N.E. 639 (1918); O'Hara et al. v. Dudley et al., 95 N.Y. 403 (1884);
Anson, Contracts (1930), §277, 283a, 285. (3) Another theory
allows the third party to recover on the basis of quasi-contract, but
this theory breaks down because there is no unjust enrichment.
Anson, Contracts (1930), 295. (4) The equitable asset theory holds
that the promisee is the debtor of the beneficiary and hence makes
a contract for his benefit, and this becomes an equitable asset of
the beneficiary; however, this could apply only in the case of a
third party creditor beneficiary and not in the case of a donee
beneficiary. National Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U.S. 123 (1878);
Hall v. Marston, 17 Mass. 575 (1822); Anson Contracts, §286. (5)
One theory speaks of the third party's recovery as an equitable
remedy, but this does not explain antecedent rights and duties.
Smith et al. v. Thompson et al., 250 Mich. 302, 230 N.W. 156, 73
A.L.R. 1389, 1395 (1930). The theory of the instant case is immune
from all of the above-mentioned objections.
5. Hageman v. Holmes, 179 Ill. 275, 53 N.E. 739 (1899).
6. Kinnan v. Hurst Co., 317 Ill. 251, 148 N.E. 12 (1925).
7. Vial v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Society, 257 Ill. 355, 100 N.E. 929,
44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 317 (1913).
8. Searles v. City of Flora, 225 Ill. 167, 80 N.E. 98 (1906).
9. 27 Am. Jur., Indemnity, sec 20.
10. La Mourea v. Rhude, 209 Minn. 53, 259 N.W. 304, 306 (1940).
11. Carson Pirie Scott & Company v. W. J. Parrett et al., 346 Ill. 252
178 N.E. 498, 81 A.L.R. 1262, 1271 (1931).
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